Book description
Human factors and usability issues have traditionally played a limited role in security research and secure systems development. Security experts have largely ignored usability issues--both because they often failed to recognize the importance of human factors and because they lacked the expertise to address them.
But there is a growing recognition that today's security problems can be solved only by addressing issues of usability and human factors. Increasingly, well-publicized security breaches are attributed to human errors that might have been prevented through more usable software. Indeed, the world's future cyber-security depends upon the deployment of security technology that can be broadly used by untrained computer users.
Still, many people believe there is an inherent tradeoff between computer security and usability. It's true that a computer without passwords is usable, but not very secure. A computer that makes you authenticate every five minutes with a password and a fresh drop of blood might be very secure, but nobody would use it. Clearly, people need computers, and if they can't use one that's secure, they'll use one that isn't. Unfortunately, unsecured systems aren't usable for long, either. They get hacked, compromised, and otherwise rendered useless.
There is increasing agreement that we need to design secure systems that people can actually use, but less agreement about how to reach this goal. Security & Usability is the first book-length work describing the current state of the art in this emerging field. Edited by security experts Dr. Lorrie Faith Cranor and Dr. Simson Garfinkel, and authored by cutting-edge security and human-computerinteraction (HCI) researchers world-wide, this volume is expected to become both a classic reference and an inspiration for future research.
Security & Usability groups 34 essays into six parts:
- Realigning Usability and Security---with careful attention to user-centered design principles, security and usability can be synergistic.
- Authentication Mechanisms-- techniques for identifying and authenticating computer users.
- Secure Systems--how system software can deliver or destroy a secure user experience.
- Privacy and Anonymity Systems--methods for allowing people to control the release of personal information.
- Commercializing Usability: The Vendor Perspective--specific experiences of security and software vendors (e.g.,IBM, Microsoft, Lotus, Firefox, and Zone Labs) in addressing usability.
- The Classics--groundbreaking papers that sparked the field of security and usability.
This book is expected to start an avalanche of discussion, new ideas, and further advances in this important field.
Publisher resources
Table of contents
- Security and Usability
- Preface
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I. Realigning Usability and Security
- One. Psychological Acceptability Revisited
- Two. Why Do We Need It? How Do We Get It?
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Three. Design for Usability
- 3.1. Death by Security
- 3.2. Balance Security and Usability
- 3.3. Balance Privacy and Security
- 3.4. Build a Secure Internet
- 3.5. Conclusion
- 3.6. About the Author
- Four. Usability Design and Evaluation for Privacy and Security Solutions
- Five. Designing Systems That People Will Trust
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II. Authentication Mechanisms
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Six. Evaluating Authentication Mechanisms
- 6.1. Authentication
- 6.2. Authentication Mechanisms
- 6.3. Quality Criteria
- 6.4. Environmental Considerations
- 6.5. Choosing a Mechanism
- 6.6. Conclusion
- 6.7. About the Author
- Seven. The Memorability and Security of Passwords
- Eight. Designing Authentication Systems with Challenge Questions
- Nine. Graphical Passwords
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Ten. Usable Biometrics
- 10.1. Introduction
- 10.2. Where Are Biometrics Used?
- 10.3. Biometrics and Public Technology: The ATM Example
- 10.4. Evaluating Biometrics
- 10.5. Incorporating User Factors into Testing
- 10.6. Conclusion
- 10.7. About the Author
- Eleven. Identifying Users from Their Typing Patterns
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Twelve. The Usability of Security Devices
- 12.1. Introduction
- 12.2. Overview of Security Devices
- 12.3. Usability Testing of Security Devices
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12.4. A Usability Study of Cryptographic Smart Cards
- 12.4.1. Aim and Scope
- 12.4.2. Context and Roles Definition
- 12.4.3. User Selection
- 12.4.4. Task Definition
- 12.4.5. Measurement Apparatus
- 12.4.6. Processing for Statistical Significance
- 12.4.7. Computation of the Quality Attributes Scores
- 12.4.8. Results and Interpretation
- 12.4.9. Some Initial Conclusions
- 12.5. Recommendations and Open Research Questions
- 12.6. Conclusion
- 12.7. Acknowledgments
- 12.8. About the Authors
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Six. Evaluating Authentication Mechanisms
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III. Secure Systems
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Thirteen. Guidelines and Strategies for Secure Interaction Design
- 13.1. Introduction
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13.2. Design Guidelines
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13.2.1. Authorization
- 13.2.1.1. 1. Match the most comfortable way to do tasks with the least granting of authority.
- 13.2.1.2. 2. Grant authority to others in accordance with user actions indicating consent.
- 13.2.1.3. 3. Offer the user ways to reduce others’ authority to access the user’s resources.
- 13.2.1.4. 4. Maintain accurate awareness of others’ authority as relevant to user decisions.
- 13.2.1.5. 5. Maintain accurate awareness of the user’s own authority to access resources.
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13.2.2. Communication
- 13.2.2.1. 6. Protect the user’s channels to agents that manipulate authority on the user’s behalf.
- 13.2.2.2. 7. Enable the user to express safe security policies in terms that fit the user’s task.
- 13.2.2.3. 8. Draw distinctions among objects and actions along boundaries relevant to the task.
- 13.2.2.4. 9. Present objects and actions using distinguishable, truthful appearances.
- 13.2.2.5. 10. Indicate clearly the consequences of decisions that the user is expected to make.
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13.2.1. Authorization
- 13.3. Design Strategies
- 13.4. Conclusion
- 13.5. Acknowledgments
- 13.6. About the Author
- Fourteen. Fighting Phishing at the User Interface
- Fifteen. Sanitization and Usability
- Sixteen. Making the Impossible Easy: Usable PKI
- Seventeen. Simple Desktop Security with Chameleon
- Eighteen. Security Administration Tools and Practices
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Thirteen. Guidelines and Strategies for Secure Interaction Design
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IV. Privacy and Anonymity Systems
- Ninteen. Privacy Issues and Human-Computer Interaction
- Twenty. A User-Centric Privacy Space Framework
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Twenty One. Five Pitfalls in the Design for Privacy
- 21.1. Introduction
- 21.2. Faces: (Mis)Managing Ubicomp Privacy
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21.3. Five Pitfalls to Heed When Designing for Privacy
- 21.3.1. Concerning Understanding
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21.3.2. Concerning Action
- 21.3.2.1. Pitfall 3: Emphasizing configuration over action
- 21.3.2.2. Evidence: Falling into the pitfall
- 21.3.2.3. Evidence: Avoiding the pitfall
- 21.3.2.4. Pitfall 4: Lacking coarse-grained control
- 21.3.2.5. Evidence: Falling into the pitfall
- 21.3.2.6. Evidence: Avoiding the pitfall
- 21.3.2.7. Pitfall 5: Inhibiting established practice
- 21.3.2.8. Evidence: Falling into the pitfall
- 21.3.2.9. Evidence: Avoiding the pitfall
- 21.4. Discussion
- 21.5. Conclusion
- 21.6. Acknowledgments
- 21.7. About the Authors
- Twenty Two. Privacy Policies and Privacy Preferences
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Twenty Three. Privacy Analysis for the Casual User with Bugnosis
- 23.1. Introduction
- 23.2. The Audience for Bugnosis
- 23.3. Cookies, Web Bugs, and User Tracking
- 23.4. The Graphic Identity
- 23.5. Making It Simple Is Complicated
- 23.6. Looking Ahead
- 23.7. Acknowledgments
- 23.8. About the Author
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Twenty Four. Informed Consent by Design
- 24.1. Introduction
- 24.2. A Model of Informed Consent for Information Systems
- 24.3. Possibilities and Limitations for Informed Consent: Redesigning Cookie Handling in a Web Browser
- 24.4. Informing Through Interaction Design: What Users Understand About Secure Connections Through Their Web Browsing
- 24.5. The Scope of Informed Consent: Questions Motivated by Gmail
- 24.6. Acknowledgments
- 24.7. About the Authors
- Twenty Five. Social Approaches to End-User Privacy Management
- Twenty Six. Anonymity Loves Company: Usability and the Network Effect
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V. Commercializing Usability: The Vendor Perspective
- Twenty Seven. ZoneAlarm: Creating Usable Security Products for Consumers
- Twenty Eight. Firefox and the Worry-Free Web
- Twenty Nine. Users and Trust: A Microsoft Case Study
- Thirty. IBM Lotus Notes/Domino: Embedding Security in Collaborative Applications
- Thirty One. Achieving Usable Security in Groove Virtual Office
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VI. The Classics
- Thirty Two. Users Are Not the Enemy
- Thirty Three. Usability and Privacy: A Study of KaZaA P2P File Sharing
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Thirty Four. Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt
- 34.1. Introduction
- 34.2. Understanding the Problem
- 34.3. Evaluation Methods
- 34.4. Cognitive Walkthrough
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34.5. User Test
- 34.5.1. Purpose
- 34.5.2. Description
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34.5.3. Results
- 34.5.3.1. Avoiding dangerous errors
- 34.5.3.2. Figuring out how to encrypt with any key
- 34.5.3.3. Figuring out the correct key to encrypt with
- 34.5.3.4. Decrypting an email message
- 34.5.3.5. Publishing the public key
- 34.5.3.6. Getting other people’s public keys
- 34.5.3.7. Handling the mixed key types problem
- 34.5.3.8. Signing an email message
- 34.5.3.9. Verifying a signature on an email message
- 34.5.3.10. Creating a backup revocation certificate
- 34.5.3.11. Deciding whether to trust keys from the key server
- 34.6. Conclusion
- 34.7. Related Work
- 34.8. Acknowledgments
- 34.9. About the Authors
- Index
- About the Authors
- Colophon
- Copyright
Product information
- Title: Security and Usability
- Author(s):
- Release date: August 2005
- Publisher(s): O'Reilly Media, Inc.
- ISBN: 9780596553852
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