``gross-of-tax'' price) rises from q
0
to q
T
, the consumers suVer a loss of
consumer surplus (ignoring income eVects) equal to q
T
BCq
0
. Because the
producer price (the ``net-of-tax'' price) falls from p
0
to p
T
the producers
suVer a loss of producer surplus equal to p
0
CDp
T
. Using the impact, or tax
revenue, as a measure of the true burdens, then, would overstate the produ-
cers' true economic losses by (q
T
BAp
0
CAD) and understate the con-
sumer's true economic losses by q
T
BCq
0
.
1
Even though this example is only a partial equilibrium analysis of tax
incidence, it illustrates a fundamental point: The market's reactions to a tax
are a crucial determinant of its ultimate pattern of burdens.
FIRST-BEST THEORY, SECOND-BEST THEORY,
AND TAX INCIDENCE
We have delayed discussing the general theory of tax incidence until this part
of the text since the most interesting questions in tax incidence are inherently
second best in nature, precisely because they depend on the market's response
to distorting taxation. In Wrst-best theory, all questions of distributional
equity are incorporated into the interpersonal equity conditions,
@W
@U
h
@U
h
@I
h
@W
@U
j
@U
j
@I
j
all h, j 1, ...,H 16:1
which the government satisWes through a set of lump-sum taxes and transfers
among the consumers. As a general rule, these lump-sum redistributions
aVect equilibrium market prices, contrary to the common assumption that
they do not, and these price changes in turn aVect people's utilities. The
incidence, or burden, on the consumers could presumably be measured as
the diV erence in their utility levels before and after government redistribu-
tion, but computing the change in utility for each person is not especially
interesting. Consider the various possibilities.
On the one hand, the equilibrium market prices may not change if, for
example, aggregate production technology is linear with constant marginal
opportunity costs. If producer prices remain unchanged, so too will the
vector of consumer prices with lump-sum redistributions. In this case, the
tax and transfer payments are perfect income proxies for the change in utility
in this senseÐif any one person received (paid) the tax (transfer) back from
(to) the government, his original utility level would be restored. Therefore,
the impact and incidence of the redistribution are identical, so that the
incidence question is trivial. In practice, tax theorists have often been willing
1
This example is meant only as an illustration of the distinction between tax impact and tax
incidence. As we have noted in other contexts, partial equilibrium Marshallian consumer and
producer surpluses are generally not valid measures of consumer and producer losses.
16. THE THEORY AND MEASUREMENT OF TAX INCIDENCE 525

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