Auction Theory, 2nd Edition

Auction Theory, 2nd Edition

by Vijay Krishna
Released September 2009
Publisher(s): Academic Press
ISBN: 9780080922935

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Book description

Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions.
  • Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions
  • New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications
  • New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points

Table of contents

  1. Front Cover
  2. Title Page
  3. Copyright Page
  4. Dedication Page
  5. Table of Contents
  6. Preface
  7. Chapter 1. Introduction
    1. 1.1 Some Common Auction Forms
    2. 1.2 Valuations
    3. 1.3 Equivalent Auctions
    4. 1.4 Revenue versus Efficiency
    5. 1.5 What Is an Auction?
    6. 1.6 Outline of Part I
  8. Part I: Single-Object Auctions
    1. Chapter 2. Private Value Auctions: A First Look
      1. 2.1 The Symmetric Model
      2. 2.2 Second-Price Auctions
      3. 2.3 First-Price Auctions
      4. 2.4 Revenue Comparison
      5. 2.5 Reserve Prices (1/2)
      6. 2.5 Reserve Prices (2/2)
    2. Chapter 3. The Revenue Equivalence Principle
      1. 3.1 Main Result
      2. 3.2 Some Applications of the Revenue Equivalence Principle (1/2)
      3. 3.2 Some Applications of the Revenue Equivalence Principle (2/2)
        1. 3.2.1 Unusual Auctions
        2. 3.2.2 Uncertain Number of Bidders
    3. Chapter 4. Qualifications and Extensions
      1. 4.1 Risk-Averse Bidders
      2. 4.2 Budget Constraints
        1. 4.2.1 Second-Price Auctions
        2. 4.2.2 First-Price Auctions
        3. 4.2.3 Revenue Comparison
      3. 4.3 Asymmetries among Bidders (1/2)
      4. 4.3 Asymmetries among Bidders (2/2)
        1. 4.3.1 Asymmetric First-Price Auctions with Two Bidders
        2. 4.3.2 Revenue Comparison
        3. 4.3.3 Efficiency Comparison
      5. 4.4 Resale and Efficiency (1/2)
      6. 4.4 Resale and Efficiency (2/2)
    4. Chapter 5. Mechanism Design
      1. 5.1 Mechanisms
        1. 5.1.1 The Revelation Principle
        2. 5.1.2 Incentive Compatibility
        3. 5.1.3 Individual Rationality
      2. 5.2 Optimal Mechanisms (1/2)
      3. 5.2 Optimal Mechanisms (2/2)
        1. 5.2.1 Setup
        2. 5.2.2 Solution
        3. 5.2.3 Discussion and Interpretation
        4. 5.2.4 Auctions versus Mechanisms
      4. 5.3 Efficient Mechanisms (1/2)
      5. 5.3 Efficient Mechanisms (2/2)
        1. 5.3.1 The VCG Mechanism
        2. 5.3.2 Budget Balance
        3. 5.3.3 An Application to Bilateral Trade
    5. Chapter 6. Auctions with Interdependent Values
      1. 6.1 The Symmetric Model
      2. 6.2 Second-Price Auctions
      3. 6.3 English Auctions
      4. 6.4 First-Price Auctions
      5. 6.5 Revenue Comparisons
        1. 6.5.1 English versus Second-Price Auctions
        2. 6.5.2 Second-Price versus First-Price Auctions
      6. 6.6 Efficiency
    6. Chapter 7. The Revenue Ranking (“Linkage”) Principle
      1. 7.1 The Main Result
      2. 7.2 Public Information
      3. 7.3 An Alternative Linkage Principle
    7. Chapter 8. Asymmetries and Other Complications
      1. 8.1 Failures of the Linkage Principle
      2. 8.2 Asymmetric Equilibria in Symmetric Second-Price Auctions
      3. 8.3 Asymmetrically Informed Bidders
      4. 8.4 Reserve Prices and Entry Fees (1/2)
      5. 8.4 Reserve Prices and Entry Fees (2/2)
    8. Chapter 9. Efficiency and the English Auction
      1. 9.1 The Single Crossing Condition
      2. 9.2 Two-Bidder Auctions
      3. 9.3 The Average Crossing Condition
      4. 9.4 Three or More Bidders
      5. 9.5 Proof of Proposition 9.2
      6. 9.6 Miscellany
    9. Chapter 10. Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values
      1. 10.1 Efficient Mechanisms
      2. 10.2 Optimal Mechanisms (1/2)
      3. 10.2 Optimal Mechanisms (2/2)
    10. Chapter 11. Bidding Rings
      1. 11.1 Collusion in Second-Price Auctions (1/2)
      2. 11.1 Collusion in Second-Price Auctions (2/2)
        1. 11.1.1 Efficient Collusion
        2. 11.1.2 Reserve Prices in the Face of Collusion
      3. 11.2 Collusion in First-Price Auctions
  9. Part II: Multiple-Object Auctions
    1. Chapter 12. An Introduction to Multiple-Object Auctions
      1. 12.1 Sealed-Bid Auctions for Selling Identical Units
        1. 12.1.1 Discriminatory Auctions
        2. 12.1.2 Uniform-Price Auctions
        3. 12.1.3 Vickrey Auctions
      2. 12.2 Some Open Auctions (1/2)
      3. 12.2 Some Open Auctions (2/2)
        1. 12.2.1 Dutch Auctions
        2. 12.2.2 English Auctions
        3. 12.2.3 Ausubel Auctions
    2. Chapter 13. Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values
      1. 13.1 The Basic Model
      2. 13.2 Vickrey Auctions
      3. 13.3 Efficiency in Multiunit Auctions
      4. 13.4 Uniform-Price Auctions (1/2)
      5. 13.4 Uniform-Price Auctions (2/2)
        1. 13.4.1 Demand Reduction
        2. 13.4.2 Single-Unit Demand
      6. 13.5 Discriminatory Auctions (1/2)
      7. 13.5 Discriminatory Auctions (2/2)
        1. 13.5.1 Structure of Equilibria
        2. 13.5.2 Single-Unit Demand
    3. Chapter 14. Some Revenue Considerations
      1. 14.1 Revenue Equivalence in Multiunit Auctions
      2. 14.2 Revenue Equivalence with Multiunit Demand: An Example (1/2)
      3. 14.2 Revenue Equivalence with Multiunit Demand: An Example (2/2)
    4. Chapter 15. Sequential Sales
      1. 15.1 Sequential First-Price Auctions
        1. 15.1.1 Two Units
        2. 15.1.2 More than Two Units
        3. 15.1.3 Equilibrium Bids and Prices
      2. 15.2 Sequential Second-Price Auctions (1/2)
      3. 15.2 Sequential Second-Price Auctions (2/2)
        1. 15.2.1 Revenue Equivalence
        2. 15.2.2 Equilibrium Bids
    5. Chapter 16. Nonidentical Objects
      1. 16.1 The Model
      2. 16.2 Efficient Allocations
      3. 16.3 Substitutes and Complements
      4. 16.4 Bundling
      5. 16.5 Some Computational Issues
      6. 16.6 Budget Constraints
    6. Chapter 17. Packages and Positions
      1. 17.1 Package Auctions
        1. 17.1.1 The Ascending Auction
        2. 17.1.2 Gross Substitutes
        3. 17.1.3 Equilibrium of the Proxy Auction
      2. 17.2 Position Auctions (1/2)
      3. 17.2 Position Auctions (2/2)
    7. Chapter 18. Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values
      1. 18.1 One-Dimensional Signals
        1. 18.1.1 An Efficient Direct Mechanism
        2. 18.1.2 Efficiency via Open Auctions
      2. 18.2 Multidimensional Signals (1/2)
      3. 18.2 Multidimensional Signals (2/2)
        1. 18.2.1 Single Object
        2. 18.2.2 Multiple Objects
  10. Part III: Appendices
    1. Appendix A. Continuous Distributions (1/2)
    2. Appendix A. Continuous Distributions (2/2)
    3. Appendix B. Stochastic Orders (1/2)
    4. Appendix B. Stochastic Orders (2/2)
    5. Appendix C. Order Statistics
    6. Appendix D. Affiliated Random Variables
    7. Appendix E. Some Linear Algebra (1/2)
    8. Appendix E. Some Linear Algebra (2/2)
    9. Appendix F: Games of Incomplete Information
    10. Appendix G. Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions (1/2)
    11. Appendix G. Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions (2/2)
  11. Bibliography (1/2)
  12. Bibliography (2/2)
  13. Index (1/2)
  14. Index (2/2)

Product information

  • Title: Auction Theory, 2nd Edition
  • Author(s): Vijay Krishna
  • Release date: September 2009
  • Publisher(s): Academic Press
  • ISBN: 9780080922935